QUESTIONS RELATING TO TIME IN.CASES OF
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
FIRST PAPFR.

English Cases of the Eighteenth Century.
The object of this paper is to ascertain how far the passage
of time can be used by a defendant, in a suit for a specific
performance of a contract, to defeat the relief demanded by
the plaintiff? Logically, the subject falls under three heads.
First: Those which discuss the amount of time which, in
the contract sought to be enforced, the plaintiff had to fulfill
his promises. Second: Those which answer the question:
Suppose the plaintiff is in fault in not -completing his
promises in the time limited in the contract, what is the
'consequence of this default? Third: Those in which the
delay-of the plaintiff is not a delay in fulfilling his promises,
but in bringing his bill. When we examine the actual decisions, however, we find the ideas developed in one class of
cases affect the decisions in the others. At least as far as the
first two classes just mentioned are concerned the subject develops as a whole, though there is no logical connection between the two facts. While, therefore, bearing in mind this
logical division of the subject, I shall endeavor to follow the
actual course of successive decisions, first taking up the English Cases of the Eighteenth Century. Perhaps the fist reported case involving the specific performance of a contract,
in which the effect of the passage of time on the rights of the
parties is discussed, is Hayes v. Caryll.- There, in September, 1697, A. agreed to sell to B. certain land. By the
terms of the contract the title was to be made out within
one month. After two years and a half and the death of
the vendor, the vendee brought his bill against the heir for
a specific performance. The defendant's counsel first
asserted that the delay was due to the plaintiff who had
*made fanciful objections to the title. He then pointed out,

x Bro.

P. C. 126, Tom. Ed., i7o2.
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that since the contract was made circumstances had changed;
his father had agreed to sell because he was in need of ready
money, but the money had now been procured elsewhere,
and, therefore, the present defendant had no need or desire
to part with the estate. The court dismissed the hill, but
whether for these or other reasons advanced by the defendant's counsel is not stated. The argument suggests two
questions. First: How far the peculiar circumstances of
one of the parties, rendering it important to him to have a
prompt execution, should be taken into consideration by a
court in case there has been a delay? Second: If in a contract of sale the delay is caused by objections to title,- do
these objections have to be *alid if the party making them
wishes to avoid the consequences of the delay? The other
reported cases of the century do not decide 2either of these
questions; the second is not again discussed.
The next case, that of Smith v. Dolman, is important as
it illustrates the confused state of English land titles during
the period, a fact which has had important influence on the
development of the subject under discussion. In 1695 a
contract was made for the sale of real property, a good conveyance to be made on November 28. In November the
vendee went into possession, but the vendor made no conveyance; Finding some encumbrances on the estate the
vendee discharged them. 'He then discovered other encumbrances; these, though requested to do so, the vendor did not
take any steps to remove. In 1699 the vendee asked the
Court of Chancery to either release him from his contract or
require the vendor to give him a good title. The court
directed that the defendant make a good title by Michaelmas
17oo or the plaintiff to stand relieved of the contract. The,
question of the title was referred to a. master, who does not
seem to have madi any report until i7o4, when he indicated
'The case itself seems to have had no influence. I have mentiohied
it at length for these reasons: It is the first case; it raises two apparently important questions, and subsequent cases will show that it is a
good illustration of what often happens in.the law's development; an
apparently important question raised in an early case not again dis-"
cussed until our own day.
'6Bro. P. C 291, Tom. Ed., i7o8.
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that the encumbrances still existing, amounted to much
more than the purchase money. These the 'vendor seems to
have set about to remove, but he title was not clear until
1708. In October of that year, thirteen years after the
original contract, the vendee was obliged to accept title and
pay the balance of the purchase money. The vendee appealed, setting up the delay. The vendor's counsel took the
position that the vendee 'should not complain of the delay
because during all the time he had been in undisturbed possession. This argument seems to have, been effective. At
any rate the decree was affirmed. It may be that the case
stands merely for the statement, that the vendee, after holding possession of the estate, and urging the vendor to clear
the title, cannot, after the vendor has cleared the title, turn
round and refuse to take it. Such a proposition. is almost
self-evident. But the whole course of the case, and the
difficulty land-owners then had in making clear titles to their
estates disclosed, suggests the question, whether the vendee
was not obliged to allow the vendor time to complete his
-title beyond that stipulated in the contract? In other words
whether the vendee, in Smith v. Dolman, finding on November 28 that a good title could not be then made, could have
terminated the contract?
The leading case of the first half of the eighteenth
century is Vernon v. Stephens.4 There A. agreed- to
purchase an estate from B., the purchase money to be
paid at stated times. A. having made default in respect to
all payments after the first, the parties made a. new agreement in which A. agreed to pay the balance due before a
certain day or A. to lose the estate and all the money he had
paid. A. made another default, due in part to the scarcity
of money in 172o, and in part to thedeath of B. and the
failure of his executors to act. Subsequently A. offering
the balance due with interest and costs, secured a specific
performance of the agreement. The Lord Chancellor said:
"Here have been solemn agreements, that ought not lightly
to be got over; but, however, if the defendant has his money,
interest and costs, he will have no reason to complain of having suffered; on the contrary it would be a great hardship
d2 P. Win. 66, x72z
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on the plaintiff to lose all the money he -has paid; lapse of
time in payment may be recompensed with interest and
costs; and as to their agreements they were intended only as
security for payment of money, which end is answered by
the payment of principal, interest and costs." 5 It will be
noted that the action of the court in as far as it ifivolved
relief against the forfeiture of money already paid was
nothing new. A court of equity had already relieved against
a forfeiture in the case of mortgages.6 But in this case they
not only prevent the vendee losing the money already paid,
but enforce the contract after the time stipulated for its
termination. In explaining his action Lord Macclesfield
shows the influence of three distinct ideas. There is the
thought that it is a hard bargain and that equity, relieving
against it, does substantial justice. This thought justifies
relief against the forfeiture, but hardly the taking of the
land from the vendor. The other two ideas, however, justify
the full action of the court. There is the thought regarding
compensation, treating as it does the default of the vendee
in payment on the day stipulated as a breach of a minor
term of the contract, while the concluding words reflect the
idea that equity will look at the real contract between the
parties, and that doing so in this case they find it a contract
in which the land is simply collateral security for the payment of the balance of the purchase money.
The last two cases illustrate what was evidently the attitude of the court at this time, namely, that in contracts for
the sale of land, stipulations in regard to time were not important. Indeed the Reporter, Atkyns, represents Lord Hardwick, in the case of Gibson v. Patterson,7 as granting specific
performance to a vendor of land without regard to his negligence "in not tending a conveyance within the time limited
by the articles," on the ground that "most cases which were
brought in this court relating to the execution of articles for
'P. 67.
'i Y. B. 9 Ed. 4, 25, I C. P. Coop., Append. 535, 536. Ed. 1838.
So
also Chancery had cancelled bonds given by young men for a greater
amount than the money they received. Walter v. Dolt, 28 Car. ii, Eq.
Cas. go P1. 2.

TI Atk. 12, 1737.
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the sale of land were open to this objection.?' And, though
it has been questioned whether Lord Hardwick ever used the
words attributed to him, the difficulty of making a good title,
the. custom of inserting a definite day for the conveyance
in articles of sale, and the absence of cases raising the delay
of the vendor as a defence, justifies us in supposing, that the
fact that a vendor did not complete his title within the time
limited in the articles was such a common occurrence that
practically neither party ever took any ngtice of it.8
In the last half of the Eighteenth Century we have, in
Greson v. Riddle," a case in which the court seems to have
'Lord Loughborough was of the opinion that there was nothing in
the case of Gibson v. Pattersonwhich warranted the assertion attributed
to Lord Hardwick by the Reporter, the inference being that he never
made such an assertion. See Lloyd v. Collett, 1793, as reported in a
note to Harrington v. Wheeler, 4 Ves. 69o. This opinion of Lord
Loughborough's may be questioned. Lord Colchester's MS. notes
contain a copy of the case. See Lloyd v. Collett as reported 4 Bro. C.
C. 348, note, Perkins' Ed. From this copy it would appear that the
Registry details the fact that there was a contract for the sale of an
estate, dated November 30, the formal articles to be drawn on or before
the following February. In March, probably March, 1736, or 7 [It
is printed 1754' an evident misprint, as Atkyns gives the case as having
been decided by Lord Hardwick January 31, 1737], the vendor offered
to convey. The vendor asserts that the vendee said he had no money,
that he was off with the bargain and that he would flee to Scotland
if they pressed him. The offer of the vendor was made after the time
stipulated for in the articles. The fact that the plaintiff asserted that the
vendee refused to take because he had no money, would not be incompatible with the vendee himself taking the position that the vendor had
not produced his title deeds or tendered a conveyance at the proper
time.
a 783. Before the Lords Commissioners. Given by Sir Samuel
Romilly in his argument in Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 268. Besides the
cases on options to renew leases spoken of later in note 37, there are
two unimportant and badly reported cases which we have omitted to
mention. One Potts v. Webb, .mentioned by counsel in Pincke V'. Curteis, 4 Bro. C. C. 238 Perk. Ed., probably decided about 1784, in which
Lord Thurlow is represented as refusing specific performance to a
v-endor of land because he had not made out his title within the time
limited by the articles, and Williams v. Bohman, also referred to in the
argument of Pincke v. Curteis, and probably decided about the same
time, in which the same Lord Chancellor is represented as enforcing an
agreement though considerable time had elapsed since the time limited
by the articles.
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gone farther in disregarding the element of time than in any
other case. There the contract expressly provided that in
case the title should not be complete in two months the agreement was to be void. There was an outstanding legal estate
which prevented the title being perfected within the time
limited. Apparently after the time limit had expired a bill
was successfully brought by the vendor to obtain specific
performance. Mr. Mansfield for the defendant argued that
it was the intention of the parties that the agreement should
be void if not performed within the time, and that if this
agreement would not hold it would be necessary to insert a
clause that the agreement would be void notwithstanding
the decision of a court of chancery. To which Lord
Thurlow replied: "Such a clause might be inserted, and the
parties would be just as forward as they were then." Here
is a decision which apparently takes the extreme position,
that if A. wishes to sell land to B. he cannot agree on a time
when the sale shall be off if not completed. Lord Thurlow
was probably developing the idea of forfeiture. But it may
be pointed out that there is a difference in forfeiting a sum
of money or property because of the non-performance of an
act, and losing the prospective benefits of an incomplete
purchase. The conception that to lose the. purchase money
because the title had not been made out by a particular day
amounted to a forfeiture, was assisted by the conception that
the estate was the estate of the vendee and therefore the
money the money of the vendor, from the moment of the
contract. This explanation is made by Lord Eldon. 10 The
fiction that in equity, a thing Which is to be done is done, has
assisted in the confusion of more subjects than the consequence of not performing agreements of sale on the day
stipulated."
The position attributed to Lord Thurlow in the case just
mentioned seems, as stated, to mark the extreme limit of
the indulgence of a court of equity to the plaintiff who has
not fulfilled the stipulations of the contract for the sale of
an estate in regard to time. A few years later, in the case of
" Seton v. Slade, 7

Ves. 265, 18o2, 274.
' Compare the case at law decided about this time by Lord Kenyon,
Berry v. Young, 2 Esp. 640, 1788. Cited in Farrerv. Nightingale.
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Pincke v. Curteis,12 we 'note a reaction. *The sale was by
auction on November 15, 1791, the conveyance to be completed on the fifth of April following. In January and
again in February the purchaser asked for the abstract of
title, and shortly after April fifth he demanded the return
of the deposit which he had paid. On April 2I. he received
the abstract; examined it, and finding a flaw refused to
proceed, and again demanded his deposit, beginning an
action at law for its recovery. The bill was filed in Novem-.
ber, 1792, for an injunction to restrain the action at law.
and for a reference of the title to a: master to ascertain if a
good title could be made. The court acted favorably on
the bill. 13

Lord Commissioner Ashurst takes the position

that: "If there is no damage done to either party, an agree-.
ment may be enforced after the time named.' 4 Lord Commissioner Wilson, however, cites Lord Loughborough in an
earlier unreported case,. Ambrose v. Hodgson., for the position that in sales by auction, when the time of completing is
specified, and a deposit is paid, "if the title is not made
out at the time the vendee is entitled to take back hig
deposit. ' ' 15 He concurred in disregarding the defence in
the case before him, because the vendee had waived the
delay by examining the abstract of title sent to him after
the 'day fixed for the completion of the transaction.18
In Lloyd v. Collett we have a case fully reported, 1 7 in
which Lord Loughborough takes the position attributed to
Bro. C. C. 329, 1793, Perkins' Ed. 238.
' The case probabl, went in the end against the vendor because he
had misrepresented his title, see 4 Bro. C. C. 333, note 5, Perkins' Ed.
34

240.
144

Bro. C. C. 332, Perkins' Ed. 24o.

The case before Lord Loughborough was probably decided about
1783, when Lord Loughborough was one of the Lords Commissioners.
1" The Master of the Rolls, Sir Richard Pepper Arden, concurred in
the order of the Commissioners on the ground stated by Wilson: see
page 333. Another case decided about this time in. which continued
discussion of the title after the day set for completion wis held without
comment to prevent the vendee complaining of the delay, is Fordyce
v.

Ford, 4 Bro. C. C. 494,

1794.

174 Bro. C. C. 469, 1793. Better reported in respect to the opinion in
a note to 4 Ves. 69o.
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him by Wiison. 1 - The parties entered into a contract for the
sale of a ground rent, on the tenth of August, 1792, the

sale to be completed before the twenty-fifth of the following
March. There was a deposit by the vendee of IOO pounds.
The vendee frequently applied for the abstract of title before
March 25, and shortly after that date demanded his deposit.
In the following September the abstract was furnished, but
the vendee immediately returned it and -insisted on his
deposit. The bill for a specific performance, which was
brought by the vendor, November 16, 1783, was dismissed.
As reported in Brown the reason for the Chancellor's action
was, that he considered the "conduct of the vendor as evidence of an abandonment of his contract." As reported in
Veasey, he is made to take the position that the appointment
of a day for completion being part of the contract, there is
no liberty to rescind it, thus restating his reported position in
Ambrose v. Hodgson, that if A. agrees to complete a sale to
B. on a particular day and does not do so, the contract is at
an end. Yet practically at the same time Lord Loughborough himself throws a doubt on the universality of this
proposition, by the way in which, in Newman v. Rogers,19

he is willing to seize on other circumstances besides the
express words in the contract as a reason for terminating a

sale which is not completed on time. In that case the subject of the sale was a reversionary interest in land. There
had been delay on the part of the vendee. Lord Loughborough says: "No man sells a reversion who is not distressed for money, and it is ridiculous to talk of making him
a compensation, by giving him interest on the purchase
money during the delay."'20 This sentence makes the double
IsIn Milward v. Earl Thanct, cited in 5 Ves. 720, Lord Alvanley is
reported to have said that Lord Kenyon was ',the first to have set himself against the idea that had prevailed that when an agreement was
entered into either party could come at any time." There is apparently
no evidence that, even in agreements for the sale of land, this statement was ever strictly true; and there is also no evidence in the reports
that Lord Kenyon took any special stand in the matter, though as we
see in the text there is abundant evidence that such a stand was taken
by Lord Loughborough.
"4 Bro. C. C. 391, 1793.
=P. 393.
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suggestion, th at under some circumstances delay in the payment of the purchase money can be compensated for, and
that the character of the thing sold should be taken into
21
consideration in order to interpr'et the importance of time.
22
The case of Jonesv. Price, in the Exchequer, introduces
us to still another idea. A. in Septexiiber agreed to purchase
an estate from B. A deposit was paid. Title was to be completed on the twenty-fifth of March following. Neither
party did anything to hurry the other until March 23, when
B. said he would like to go on. A. 'detnanded the abstract
and a good title in two days. This of course was demnanding
an impossibility. A. sued for his deposit, while B. brought
a bill for an injunction and specific performance. He
secured the injunction restraining A.'s suit at law, and
seems to have been allowed an opportunity to make out a.
good title. The court took the position, that the question,
whether timeis of the essence of the contract, "depends entirely upon the manner in which the parties, themselves, by
their conduct, showed that they meant to treat' it." The court
then considers the non-action of either party, not as evidence
of the mutual abandonment of the contract, but as showing
that time was immaterial. 23 There is a good deal of
obscurity in the words "essence of the cotitract." Neverthe:
less, the tendency of the decision is clear. In order for the
defendant to show that the non-performance of the contract
on the day stipulated is fatal -to the plaintiff's claim, he must
do more than 'point to the terms of the contract, he must
prove by other evidence that time was an important element,
and slight evidence will be taken to indicate that the parties
'

This second idea is somewhat similar to that expressed by counsel

in Hayes v. Caryll, i Bro. P. C. 126, Tom. Ed. -i7O2, supra, note r, and in
the decision in Popham v. Eyre, Loft. 786, 1770, infra, note 24, namely,
that the delay of the plaintiff is important if the reason which caused
the purchaser to sell no longer exists. But there is this important difference between the two ideas: Lord Loughborough's would take the usual
situation of parties selling a particular class of commodities as interpreting the probable meaning of the parties in the contract before the
court, while the earlier cases would take for the same purpose the actual
situation of one of the parties to the contract before the court.
"3 Anstr. 924, 1797.
"P. 925.
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do not consider, and therefore the court need not consider,
time as of any importance. Theoretically both the Court of
Exchequer and Lord Loughborough tried to get at the mean*ing of the parties, practically the respective points of view
of interpretation are directly opposed to each other.
In Vernon v. Stepliens,2 4 the court had intimated that the
non-payment of money on a particular day could be compensated for by the payment of interest. In the last year of
the century a similar idea was suggested in respect to a
delay which prevented the vendee of real property from
taking possession on the time stipulated. "Time," says
Justice Chambers, "is frequently very material; but it would
be monstrous to say, the act of a mere trespasser
alone should defeat the contract. A compensation might
easily be made when the estate should be recovered for any
disadvantage
for not having possession precisely at the
25
day."
Until the end of the century, with the exception of one
unimportant case, 26 there was no discussion of the effect of
the plaintiff's laches in bringing his bill. In 1799, however, there are two reported cases which 27
involve this question. The first is Spurrier v. Handcock.
This case was a contract for the sale of a reversion made
in February, 1793. The abstract of title -proved unsatisfactory to the vendee, indeed it was imperfect, but the
vendor urged an early decision on the part of the vendee
whether he would take or not. The vendee refused to come
to any immediate decision, and there seems no doubt that
the only reason the vendor did not bring a bill to be relieved
of the bargain was due to the fact, that not being able tW
make out a good title, he would have to pay the costs of
that proceeding. In April, 1797, on hearing that thd vendor
242

P. Win. 66, 1722.

'Dicta in Omerod v. Hardman, 5 Ves. 722, 18oi, p. 732.
"Popham v. Eyre, Loff. 786, 1774, the vendee who brought a bill
for specific performance of a contract for the purchase of land, delayed
pushing the same for seven years. In the meantime the need for money
which had originally caused the vendor to agree to sell was passed.
The court dismissed the bill.
21

4 Ves. 667, 1799.
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was about to resell the' reversion, the vendee brought his bill
for a specific performance. Even after the bill was answered,
there was delay on the part of. the plaintiff, but, about the
time the replication was filed, that is in the summer of 1798,
the last life on which the reversionary interest depended
dropped, and the estate became much more valuable. At
once the plaintiff became active and was willing to accept
any title which the defendant could give. Yet the court, in
view of his conduct refused a specific performance. So also
in Harrington v. Wheeler,28 Lord Ldughborough refused
to make a vendor of real estate fulfill a contract' made in
179o, the bill, without adequate excuse for the delay, not
having been brought for nearly six years.
In the first part of this paper I stated that from a logical
point of view the subject of time could be considered as
presenting three classes of problems. First: Those which
discuss the amount of time which the plaintiff had to fulfill
his promises; those which deal with the result of an admitted
default on the part of the plaintiff in respect to the time, and
third, those in which the plaintiff's delay is not in fulfilling
his promises, but in bringing his bill. In the few cases of f
the eighteenth century which discuss the third class, there
would appear to be the underlying assumption that the plaitotiff must be diligent in asserting his rights. If this is the
only principle on which the cases of the nineteenth century
are going to proceed, then this part of the subject at any rate
is simple. It' is true, what is due diligence on the part of a
plaintiff depends upon the facts of the particular case, and
may be a question of some difficulty. There may be even
some apparent conflict in the cases. But the subject can
rightly be classed with the simple subjects of the law, which
are those in which the courts consciously or unconsciously
respond to a single impulse, idea or principle. With the
first two classes of questions in which the element of time is
discussed, the early cases indicate the possibility of difficulty.
In the-first place, there is no evidence of any separation of
the question "What was the intention of thie parties in
respect to the time of fulfillment ?" from the question "What
4 Ves. 686, 179.
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should be the consequence of the plaintiff's default?" Thus
in Vernon v. Stephens, 29 Macclesfield treats the interest

offered by the defendant as compensation for the delay, and
in the same sentence intimates that he is enforcing the real
contract'between the parties. But the principal difficulty of
the subject is shown by the fact that the decisions appear
to be governed by what one may call two conflicting instincts
or tendencies. There is present, as we have seen in the
decisions of Lord Loughborough, the natural feeling that
an expressed or implied stipulation in a contract in respect
to time should be lived up to; that in this respect, as in any
other, an agreement once made should not be set aside. On
the other hand there is the feeling that it isan injustice for
one party to hold the other to a literal fulfillment on an
exact day. The origin of the first feeling or tendency is
identical with the origin of the obligation of any contract.
The other feeling or tendency has, I believe, its origin in the
dominant class of contracts coming before the Court of
Chancery in the eighteenth century. These were contracts
in respect to land. During the century land was rarely dealt
with for speculative purposes. It was a comparatively
stable commodity. Both of these facts tended to prevent a
delay in the fulfillment of a sale being a very serious matter
to the parties. At the same time the confusion existing in
land titles rendered it most unreasonable that a vendee
should expect his vendor to make a good title to land on a
particular day, for it was patent to all that the ability of any
one to make a good title to land within a limited time
was problematical. As stated the cases disclose the conflict
.between these two tendencies. If one party to a contract did
not perform his part of a contract on the day expressly
stipulated, and the other promptly disavowed the contract,
we have, even in the case where the subject matter of the
contract was land, at least one case in which the court held
that the party defaulting in respect to time, could not, by
afterwards offering to perforni, succeed in a bill for specific
performance.30 Here we have an instance where the first
tendency mentioned predominated.' It also predominated
12

P. Wim. 66, 1722.
v. Collett, 4 Bro. C. C. 469, 1793, supra, note 17.

'Lloyd
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where the hature of: the subject of the contract made a
prompt fulfillment important-to the parties.3 ' The other tenden y, that it is an injustice for one party to hold the other to
a-literal fulfillment in respect to time,, showed itself in those
decisions in relation to the sales of land, which held that if
the defendant, at the expiration of the time in which the
plaintiff was to perform, did not promptly repudiate the
contract, he was held to have waived the stipulation in
regard to-time.3 2 Even though a time was fixed for completion, if the party who intended to ir~sist on it did not give
positive evidence before the time had expired of -his intention to do so, this non-action was treated as proof that the
day of cbmpletion was an element which the parties had
agreed to treat as non-existent. 83 Again the same tendency
is shown in the idea that default in the payment of money, or
giving possession can be easily compensated;34 and in the
question "Whether time is of the essence of the contract?"
a question pregnant, from its very indefiniteness, with possibilities of escape from those terms of a contract which relate
to time.3 5 It also shows itself, not in the idea that equity will

prevent a forfeiture, but in the thought that a stipulation terminating a contract of sale if the same is not fulfilled on a
particular day partakes of the nature of a forfeiture against
which equity should relieve.36
This r6sum=6 shows us, that we cannot say, the feeling
that one should live up. to -his promises in regard to
the time for the completion of his obligations, was stronger
than the feeling that it was unfair in a defendant to insist
that he had no obligation because the plaintiff had not fulfilled on time. Neither do we see even the beginning of the
developnent of any general principle which will determine
when time shall be regarded as important and when not important. Our examination, therefore, must for the present
serve only to show the tendencies which were in conflict. In
" See note 1, supra.
Pincke v. Curteis, 4 Bro. C. C. 329, 1793, sipra,-note 12.
JJones v. Price, 3 Anstr. 824, 1797, supra, note 22.
* Vernon v. Stephens, 2 P. Wins. 66, 1722; Omerod v. Hardman, 5
Yes.

722.

'Jones v. Price, 3 Anstr. 924, 1797.

" Greson v. Riddle, 7 Ves..268, 1783, supra, note 9.

-
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the next Paper I hope to trace the development of the subject
37
in England during the period dominated by Lord Eldon.
Win. Draper Lewis.

NOTE.-On the effect of a delay of the lessee with an option to renew
to demand a renewal of a lease, on his right to such renewal.
I have omitted from this paper any discussion of the cases involving
the specific performance of covenants to renew leases, though numerous
examples of such cases in which the lessee failed to notify the lessor
of his desire to renew within the time stipulated in the original lease
exist in the reports of the eighteenth century. In the first place I have
fully treated these cases in 49 A. L. R. (0. S.) 389, July, 19oi. In
the second place, I do not think they can be regarded as cases illustrating the specific performance of contracts, any more than cases on
trusts can be so regarded. The typical case is where A. leases to B.
for three lives, and A. stipulates that if B. will nominate a new life
on the dropping of any of the lives, and pay a fine, he, A., will grant
B. a new lease. B. fails to nominate a new life or pay the fine in the
time limited, but he asks the court to overlook this negligence and
force the landlord to grant him a new lease. In Ireland the original
lease was regarded as a grant of land for an indefinite period of time,
the land to be forfeited on the non-fulfillment of certain conditions.
The Irish courts of equity, therefore, granted the renewal irrespective
of the laches of the plaintiff. These decisions have no effect on the
question of time and the specific performance of contracts. For the
facts of the Irish cases see 49 A. L. R. (0. S.) 39o-392 and notes. See
also remarks of Lord Redesdale in Lennon v. Napper, 2 Sch. & Lef. 682,
1812, 685.
The English cases regard such leases with less favor, requiring
the tenant who would insist on a renewal to notify the landlord at
about the time indicated in the original lease. The facts of the cases
are given in 49 A. L. R. (0. S.) 389, note 8. Specific performance
was denied in the following cases: Ripon v. Rowley, 1723, cited i
Ridgw. 194 (The request for renewal was to be made within one
year from the dropping of a life; it was not made for ten years);
Allen v. Hilton, Fonb. Eq. Book i, Ch. 6, sec. 12, note c, 1738 (Lease
of a colliery, with option to renew for another term if the lessee
let the lessor know of his desire for a renewal within three months of
the expiration of the first lease. The lessee did not signify his desire
for a renewal until one month before the expiration of the old lease) ;
Bayly v. The Corporation of Leominster, x Ves. 476, 1792 (There was a
covenant to renew after one of three lives had dropped. The lessee
requested a renewal after two lives had dropppd); Baynham v. Guy's
Hospital,3 Ves. 295. 1796 (Similar to previous caqe except that all three
lives seem to have dropped) ; Eaton v. Lyon, 3 Ves. 69o, 1798 (similar
to Bayly v. The Corporation of Leominster). See, however. Rawlstone
v. Bentley, 4 Bro. C. C. 415, r793. Yet, as pointed out in the article
referred to, even in England enforcement of these covenants to renew
leases was treated from the point of view of enforcing a property right
of the lessee rather than th,'- - fh cre ;;e Pp" - of r-ontracts.

